

United States District Court

EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
SHERMAN DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA	§	
	§	Case Number: 4:07-CR-00042
v.	§	Judge Mazzant
	§	
MARIA DEL RASARIO OROSCO (6)	§	

MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER

Pending before the Court is Defendant Maria Del Rasario Orosco's Motion for Compassionate Release (Dkt. #2005). The Court, having considered the motion, the response, the record, and the applicable law, finds that the motion must be **DENIED**.

I. BACKGROUND

On December 19, 2007, Defendant Maria Del Rasario Orosco ("Orosco") pleaded guilty to Conspiracy to Possess with Intent to Distribute Heroin Resulting in Serious Bodily Injury, a violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 (Dkt. #870). The Court sentenced Orosco to 240 months' imprisonment followed by a five-year term of supervised release. Orosco is serving her sentence at FCI Honolulu, with an anticipated release date of March 12, 2024 (Dkt. #2005, Exhibit 1).

On November 2, 2020, Orosco filed her first motion for compassionate release, (Dkt. #1992), which the Court denied without prejudice for failure to exhaust her administrative remedies (Dkt. #1993). On May 16, 2022, Orosco filed the instant motion seeking compassionate release based on her diabetic mother's inability to care for herself, which Orosco argues constitutes "extraordinary and compelling reasons" warranting a sentence reduction (Dkt. #2005). The Government opposes the sentence reduction, arguing Orosco has not satisfied the administrative exhaustion requirement prescribed by 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). (Dkt. #2007).

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A judgment of conviction imposing a sentence of imprisonment “constitutes a final judgment and may not be modified by a district court except in limited circumstances.” *Dillon v. United States*, 560 U.S. 817, 824 (2010) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3582(b)); *see also* 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c). One such circumstance arises from 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), the statute authorizing compassionate release. Under § 3582(c)(1)(A), a district court may grant a sentence reduction if it finds: (1) a defendant “fully exhausted all administrative rights”; (2) “extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction”; (3) “such a reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission”; and (4) such a reduction is appropriate “after considering the factors set forth in § 3553(a) to the extent that they are applicable.” 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A).

The First Step Act of 2018 made the first major changes to compassionate release since its authorization in 1984. Pub. L. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194. Procedurally, the First Step Act removed the Director of the BOP as the sole arbiter of compassionate release. Instead, the law enabled a defendant to move for compassionate release directly in district court after exhausting their administrative rights. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). Prior to this change, the BOP retained sole gatekeeping authority over compassionate release petitions. *United States v. Brooker*, 976 F.3d 228, 232 (2d Cir. 2020). This resulted in underuse and mismanagement.¹ *Id.* Through the First Step Act, Congress sought to mitigate this by “increasing the use and transparency of compassionate release.” Pub. L. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194, 5239 (capitalization omitted).

¹ In 2013, a report from the Office of the Inspector General revealed that the BOP granted compassionate release to only an average of 24 incarcerated people per year. *See* U.S. Dep’t of Just. Office of the Inspector General, *The Federal Bureau of Prisons’ Compassionate Release Program* 1 (2013), <https://www.oversight.gov/sites/default/files/oig-reports/e1306.pdf> (last visited April 14, 2020). And of the 208 people whose release requests were approved by both a warden and a BOP Regional Director, 13% died awaiting a final decision by the BOP Director. *Id.*; *see also Extraordinary and Compelling: A Re-Examination of the Justifications for Compassionate Release*, 68 MD. L. REV. 850, 868 (2009) (noting that, in the 1990s, 0.01 percent of inmates annually were granted compassionate release).

Substantively, the First Step Act also modified the “extraordinary and compelling reasons” determination. Congress never defined what constitutes “extraordinary and compelling,” but rather delegated this determination to the Sentencing Commission.² By the text of § 3582(c)(1)(A), any sentence reduction must be “consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.” However, since passage of the First Step Act, the Sentencing Commission has not updated its guidelines on compassionate release.³ This has created significant disagreement across the country whether the pre-First Step Act policy statement is still “applicable,” and thus binding on district courts.

The Fifth Circuit recently joined the Second, Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits in concluding that § 1B1.13 is no longer binding on a district court. *See United States v. Shkambi*, 2021 WL 1291609, at *4 (5th Cir. 2021) (“The district court on remand is bound only by § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) and, as always, the sentencing factors in § 3553(a). In reaching this conclusion, we align with every circuit court to have addressed the issue.”). Under this new framework, § 1B1.13 still binds district courts on motions made by the BOP, but, for motions made directly by an inmate, district courts are free to consider any relevant fact in determining if “extraordinary and compelling reasons” exist. *See Brooker*, 976 F.3d at 235–36 (because the First Step Act allows both inmates and the BOP to file compassionate-release motions under § 3582(c)(1)(A), § 1B1.13 now applies only when such motions are made by the BOP and is inapplicable when a compassionate-release motion is made by a defendant); *United States v. McCoy*, 981 F.3d 271, 282 (4th Cir. 2020) (“A sentence reduction brought about by motion of a defendant, rather than

² In 28 U.S.C. § 994(a)(2), Congress granted the Commission broad authority to promulgate “general policy statements regarding application of the guidelines or any other aspect of sentencing or sentence implementation that in the view of the Commission would further the purposes set forth in [18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)].” And in 28 U.S.C. § 994(t), “Congress instructed the Commission to ‘describe what should be considered extraordinary and compelling reasons for sentence reduction, including the criteria to be applied and a list of specific examples.’” *United States v. Garcia*, 655 F.3d 426, 435 (5th Cir. 2011) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 994(t)).

³ The Sentencing Commission currently lacks a quorum to issue new guidelines.

the BOP, is not a reduction ‘under this policy statement.’”); *United States v. Gunn*, 980 F.3d 1178, 1180 (7th Cir. 2020) (agreeing with *Brooker* and holding that there is no “applicable” policy statement for § 3582(c)(1)(A) motions after the First Step Act); *United States v. Jones*, 980 F.3d 1098, 1109 (6th Cir. 2020) (“Until the Sentencing Commission updates § 1B1.13 to reflect the First Step Act, district courts have full discretion in the interim to determine whether an ‘extraordinary and compelling’ reason justifies compassionate release”).

Despite this newfound discretion, district courts are not without guidance in determining whether “extraordinary and compelling reasons” exist. First, Congress has explicitly limited that “[r]ehabilitation of the defendant *alone* shall not be considered an extraordinary and compelling reason. 28 U.S.C. § 994(t) (emphasis added). Second, the Sentencing Commission’s policy statement and commentary is still persuasive. *United States v. Logan*, No. 97-CR-0099(3), 2021 WL 1221481 (D. Minn., Apr. 1, 2021) (finding that § 1B1.13’s definition of “extraordinary and compelling” should be afforded “substantial deference . . . as such deference is consistent with the intent (even if not mandated by the letter) of § 3582(c)(1)(A)”). Application Note 1 of the policy statement provides that “extraordinary and compelling reasons” exist when: (1) a terminal illness or other medical condition “substantially diminishes the ability of the defendant to provide self-care within the environment of a correctional facility”; (2) a defendant, who is at least 65 years old, “is experiencing a serious deterioration in physical or mental health because of the aging process” and “has served at least 10 years or 75 percent of his or her term of imprisonment”; and (3) a defendant has minor children without a caregiver or with an incapacitated spouse or partner who needs the defendant to be the caregiver. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13, n.1(A)-(C). Lastly, BOP Program Statement 5050.50 (“PS 5050.50”), amended after passage of the First Step Act, describes the factors BOP considers grounds for compassionate release. *See* PS 5050.50 ¶¶ 3–6. These grounds

are similar to the reasons identified by the Sentencing Commission, but also include a list of factors like rehabilitation and circumstances of the offense.⁴ *Id.*

Building from this guidance, district courts across the country have identified additional situations where “extraordinary and compelling reasons” exist. First, while rehabilitation alone is not an “extraordinary and compelling” reason for a sentence reduction, it can be a significant factor warranting a sentence reduction when an inmate has an otherwise qualifying condition.⁵ *See United States v. Rodriguez*, 451 F.Supp.3d 392, 405 (E.D. Pa. 2020) (noting that the Sentencing Commission itself interpreted § 3582(c)(1)(A) as allowing consideration of an inmate’s rehabilitation). If an inmate demonstrates a long, comprehensive record of rehabilitation, it goes to whether injustice would result if they remain incarcerated. *See Brooker*, 976 F.3d at 238 (identifying “the injustice of [a] lengthy sentence” as a factor that may weigh in favor of a sentence reduction). Second, courts consider any changes in law and the sentencing guidelines when determining if a sentence is extraordinary. For example, courts grant compassionate release at a remarkable rate for inmates subject to the now abolished § 924(c) sentence-stacking. *See McCoy*, 981 F.3d at 285 (“As the court observed in *Bryant*, multiple district courts have concluded that the severity of a § 924(c) sentence, combined with the enormous disparity between that sentence and the sentence a defendant would receive today, can constitute an “extraordinary and compelling” reason for relief under § 3582(c)(1)(A)”). Though Congress did not retroactively eliminate § 924(c) sentence-stacking, courts consider whether the outdated policy warrants relief on a case

⁴ PS 5050.50’s nonexclusive factors are: “the defendant’s criminal and personal history, nature of his offense, disciplinary infractions, length of sentence and amount of time served, current age and age at the time of offense and sentencing, release plans, and ‘[w]hether release would minimize the severity of the offense.’” *United States v. Saldana*, 807 F. App’x 816, 819 (10th Cir. 2020) (quoting PS 5050.50 ¶ 7).

⁵ 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g) aids the Court in determining whether a defendant is a danger to the community. Applicable factors include: “the nature and circumstances of the offense,” “the person’s character, physical and mental condition, family ties, employment, . . . criminal history,” and “the nature and seriousness of the danger to any person or the community that would be posed by the person’s release.” 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g).

by -case basis-. *See id.*⁶

Even if extraordinary and compelling reasons exist, they must outweigh the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors to warrant sentence reduction. *See* 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). These factors are:

- (1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant;
- (2) the need for the sentence imposed—
 - (A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense;
 - (B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct;
 - (C) to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; and
 - (D) to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner;
- (3) the kinds of sentences available;
- (4) the kinds of sentence and sentencing range [provided for in the U.S.S.G.] . . .
- (5) any pertinent [Sentencing Commission] policy statement . . .
- (6) the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct; and
- (7) the need to provide restitution to any victims of the offense.

Id. § 3553(a).

III. DISCUSSION

Orosco contends that her family circumstances warrant her early release (Dkt. #2005). Specifically, Orosco moves for compassionate release based on her diabetic mother's inability to care for herself and Orosco's accompanying desire to be her mother's caregiver (Dkt. #2005). In

⁶ *See* Shon Hopwood, *Second Looks & Second Chances*, 41 CARDOZO L. REV. 83, 123-24 (2019) (arguing Congress did not make § 924(c) sentence stacking retroactive because it did not want to make all inmates “*categorically*” eligible for sentencing relief, but Congress meant for relief from draconian sentences to apply “*individually*”)

response, the Government argues Orosco is not eligible for compassionate release because she has not met the administrative exhaustion requirement of § 3582(c)(1)(A) (Dkt. #2007).

Although the Court finds that Orosco has met § 3582(c)(1)(A)'s exhaustion requirement, she has not met the statute's requirement that "extraordinary and compelling reasons" exist warranting a reduction of her sentence. Accordingly, Orosco's motion must be denied.

A. Orosco Has Met Section 3582(c)(1)(A)'s Exhaustion Requirement.

Orosco's compassionate release motion may only be considered if she first meets § 3582(c)(1)(A)'s exhaustion requirement. Courts may not consider a modification to a defendant's sentence under § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) unless a motion for such a modification is properly made by the Director of the BOP or by a defendant who has fully exhausted their administrative remedies. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). Fully exhausting administrative remedies requires a denial by the warden of a defendant's facility or waiting thirty days without receiving a response to a request.⁷ *Id.*

Section 3582(c)(1)(A)'s exhaustion requirement is not waivable. *See United States v. Rivas*, 833 F. App'x 556, 558 (5th Cir. 2020) ("Because the statutory language is mandatory—that a prisoner must exhaust their BOP remedy before filing in district court—we must enforce this procedural rule . . ."); *United States v. Reeves*, No. 18-00294, 2020 WL 1816496, at *2 (W.D. La. Apr. 9, 2020) ("While the Court is well aware of the effects the Covid-19 pandemic . . . § 3582(c)(1)(A) does not provide this Court with the equitable authority to excuse Reeves' failure to exhaust his administrative remedies or to waive the 30-day waiting period."). If a defendant has not sought relief from the BOP, or has not waited thirty days since seeking relief,

⁷ BOP regulations define "warden" to include "the chief executive officer of . . . any federal penal or correctional institution or facility." 28 C.F.R. § 500.1(a); *United States v. Franco*, 973 F.3d 465, 468 (5th Cir. 2020); *c.f. United States v. Campagna*, 16 Cr. 78-01 (LGS), 2020 WL 1489829, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 27, 2020) (holding that "the denial of Defendant's request by the Residential Re-entry Manager suffices to exhaust his administrative rights").

the Court may not consider their motion.

In its response, the Government argues Orosco's motion should be denied because "she makes no mention of satisfying the administrative remedy requirement set forth in the statute and provides no evidence that she has done so" (Dkt. #2007). However, in her reply, Orosco maintains that she asked the warden at FCI Waseca, her previous facility, to grant her compassionate release and that more than thirty days have lapsed since that request (Dkt. #2008). Absent a contrary showing, the Court assumes Orosco's assertions are true. Therefore, Orosco has met § 3582(c)(1)(A)'s exhaustion requirement.

B. Orosco Has Not Met Section 3582(c)(1)(A)'s Requirement that "Extraordinary and Compelling Reasons" Warrant a Sentence Reduction.

Orosco's compassionate release motion turns on her assertion that her mother's need for care constitutes extraordinary and compelling reasons to reduce her sentence. Orosco's assertion fails because her circumstances are not severe enough to constitute "extraordinary and compelling reasons" under § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i).

The Court has discretion to decide whether Orosco's conditions present "extraordinary and compelling reasons" warranting a sentence reduction. *See Shkambi*, 2021 WL 1291609, at *4. The Court is not bound by the Sentencing Commission's policy statement and may consider any relevant facts in evaluating Orosco's condition of incarceration. *Id.* Typically, courts consider whether a defendant suffers from a serious health condition, has a record of rehabilitation, the nature and circumstances of defendant's offense, and whether a sentence is based on outdated law. *See Brooker*, 976 F.3d at 238.

Rehabilitation alone cannot support a claim for sentence reduction, but may be considered as a factor in evaluating "extraordinary and compelling reasons." *See Brooker*, 976 F.3d at 237-38; *United States v. Hudec*, No. 4:91-1-1, 2020 WL 4925675, at *5 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 20, 2020).

Here, Orosco has successfully completed numerous BOP adult education courses and programs during her incarceration (Dkt. #2005, Exhibit 1). Orosco has remained incident free and is in minimum security housing (Dkt. #2005, Exhibit 1). Accordingly, the Court finds Orosco's rehabilitative record supports her release.

That said, Orosco's family circumstances do not warrant her release. When considering family circumstances sufficient to grant sentence reduction, the United States Sentencing Guidelines state that reduction should only be granted after the "death or incapacitation of the caregiver of the defendant's minor child or minor children" or after the "incapacitation of the defendant's spouse or registered partner when the defendant would be the only available caregiver for the spouse or registered partner." U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13, n.1(C). Though Orosco contends she should be released to provide care for her diabetic mother, courts in this circuit have repeatedly held that caring for a sick and/or aging parent is not a qualifying "family circumstance" under U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(1)(A). *United States v. Latham*, No. 6:18-CR-16-4, 2020 WL 4192920, at *3 (S.D. Tex. July 20, 2020); *United States v. Caldwell*, No. 2:17-CR-774, 2020 WL 3250728, at *2 (S.D. Tex. June 16, 2020); *see also United States v. Ingram*, 2019 WL 3162305, at *2 (S.D. Ohio Jul. 16, 2019) (denying compassionate release to defendant to care for ill mother because "[m]any, if not all inmates, have aging and sick parents. Such circumstance is not extraordinary."). Further, while a few courts have expanded this language to include instances when the parents of a defendant can no longer care for themselves, *see United States v. Nevers*, No. CR 16-88, 2020 WL 3077034, at *6 (E.D. La. June 10, 2020), these courts have recognized this exception otherwise only applies if the terminal parent has no other potential family member who could provide the needed care. *See United States v. Hudec*, No. CR 4:91- 1- 1, 2020 WL 4925675, at *5 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 19, 2020). Here, Orosco has four siblings, at least one of which resides in the same area as

her mother (Dkt. #1110). Thus, while the Court recognizes the needs of Orosco's family member and is sympathetic, the limited exceptions allowing for sentence reduction based on family circumstances are not applicable in this case.

Weighing the evidence, Orosco's rehabilitative efforts are impressive, but she fails to prove that her incarceration is "extraordinary and compelling" under § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) framework. *See United States v. Stowe*, No. CR H-11-803(2), 2019 WL 4673725, at *2 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 25, 2019) (citation omitted) (stating that the defendant generally "has the burden to show circumstances meeting the test for compassionate release").⁸

* * *

Under the rule of finality, federal courts may not "modify a term of imprisonment once it has been imposed" unless one of a few "narrow exceptions" applies. *Freeman v. United States*, 564 U.S. 522, 526 (2011) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)) (plurality op.); *see also Dillon*, 560 U.S. at 819 (same). Compassionate release is one of those exceptions, but a defendant must conform both to the procedural and substantive requirements of § 3582(c)(1)(A) for a court to modify a sentence. Because Orosco has failed to meet the controlling requirements for compassionate release set forth in § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i), her Motion must be denied.

IV. CONCLUSION

It is therefore **ORDERED** that Defendant's Motion for Compassionate Release (Dkt. #2005) is **DENIED**.

⁸ Given Defendant's failure to meet § 3582(c)(1)(A)'s requirements, the Court need not address whether the applicable 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors support a sentence reduction.

SIGNED this 11th day of July, 2022.

A handwritten signature in black ink, reading "Amos Mazzant". The signature is written in a cursive style with a horizontal line underneath the name.

AMOS L. MAZZANT
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE